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Yum K. Kwan, Francis T. Lui, and Leonard K. Cheng
7.1 Introduction
Since its introduction in Mauritius in 1849, the currency board as a
form of monetary institution has generally been neglected in the econom-
ics literature.1 This is probably due to the fact that currency boards were
mainly adopted in relatively small and unimportant economies. In recent
years, the situation has changed. Argentina’s readoption of the currency
board in 1991 and its subsequent impressive economic growth record has
contributed to its credibility as a useful monetary system. Its subsequent
adoption in Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria further indicates its increas-
ing popularity. Indeed, during the recent global ﬁnancial turmoil, the cur-
rency board had been prescribed for the battered economies of Russia
and Indonesia.
There may be another reason why the literature has not paid enough
attention to the study of currency boards. Due to the lack of reasonably
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233long and systematic data series, rigorous empirical analyses of their impli-
cations were diﬃcult to conduct. Hong Kong, having a long history with
the currency board, can readily ﬁll in this gap. Its rich experiences include
the abandonment and readoption of the currency board; and, more impor-
tantly, it has gone through a series of subtle institutional changes and sev-
eral episodes of speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar. Moreover,
systematic data suﬃcient for implementing meaningful econometric anal-
yses are available.2 Properly studied, Hong Kong’s experiences can oﬀer
useful insights for economies interested in adopting a currency board.
The study of Hong Kong’s experiences with the currency board is of
theoretical interest in its own right. Stimulated by Kydland and Prescott
(1977), there have been numerous studies on the relative merit of rules
versus discretion in macroeconomic policies. The currency board, in its
pure form, is a rule-based system. However, as we shall see in this paper,
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the de facto central bank
of Hong Kong, had for some time been deviating from the rules by intro-
ducing a number of new tools of intervention. However, the trend of
greater reliance on discretion was interrupted toward the end of the Asian
ﬁnancial turmoil in 1998, when the HKMA reverted to the rule-based
system again. These changes have, in eﬀect, created natural experiments
for us to study the implications of rules versus discretion. The main objec-
tive of this paper is to test whether the currency board was more credible
under the rule-based regimes or under the discretion regime.
The next section discusses the historical background of Hong Kong’s
currency board, emphasizing the events during the ﬁnancial crisis. It
shows that the currency board has gone through three regimes as demar-
cated by the choice of rules versus discretion. Section 7.3 develops and
implements empirical tests on the credibility of the currency board under
diﬀerent regimes and interprets our ﬁndings. Section 7.4 discusses the
eﬀect of rules and discretion on the credibility of Hong Kong’s currency
board system from the point of view of delegation of functions and the
incentive to intervene. The ﬁnal section concludes.
7.2 An Event Analysis
In this section we brieﬂy outline the history of Hong Kong’s currency
board. As we shall see, it has not been a static institution. In fact, from
October 1983 to the present, the currency board has gone through three
major phases: (a) a rule-bound regime, (b) a discretion regime, and (c) a
deemphasis of discretion and a return to a rule-based regime with a conﬁ-
dence booster. The primary diﬀerence between rule and discretion is that
the former entails commitments about future policy and thus predictability
2. See Kwan and Lui (1999) for an early attempt to implement econometric estimations of
the implications of the currency board.
234 Yum K. Kwan, Francis T. Lui, and Leonard K. Chengof policy measures, whereas the latter exhibits a lack of commitment and
a lower degree of predictability. We shall use this deﬁning characteristic to
identify the periods of the three regimes. Our empirical analysis in the
next section will demonstrate that the currency board’s credibility varied
signiﬁcantly across these regimes.
Hong Kong’s ﬁrst currency board was introduced in 1935 when the gov-
ernment decided to abandon the silver standard. From then to 1967, with
the exception of four years of interruption during World War II, the Hong
Kong dollar was pegged to the pound sterling at the rate of sixteen to one.
Before issuing bank notes of sixteen Hong Kong dollars, the authorized
note-issuing private banks were obligated to pay the Exchange Fund one
pound to purchase the Certiﬁcate of Indebtedness (CI). The exchange rate
appreciated over time to HK$14.55 per pound sterling by 1967. From 1972
to 1974, the Hong Kong dollar was repegged to the U.S. dollar. After the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the government decided to let the
currency ﬂoat on 25 November 1974. However, the ﬁnancial crises caused
by anxieties over the future of Hong Kong led to great volatility and con-
siderable downward pressure on the Hong Kong dollar. Eventually, on 17
October 1983, the government reestablished the currency board system,
but this time the Hong Kong dollar was pegged to the U.S. dollar at the
ﬁxed rate of 7.8, and the peg continues to this day.3
In other words, the government promised to buy bank notes at the rate
of 7.8 per U.S. dollar. However, despite this promise, currency arbitrage
through the purchase and sale of bank notes has played little role in lock-
ing the spot rate in the market at or near parity. Instead, proximity of
the actual spot rate to the parity depends mostly on the HKMA’s active
intervention in the spot market and capital ﬂows engendered by the inter-
est rate arbitrage.
During the initial period after the peg’s reestablishment, the government
by and large was following the ﬁxed rules of the currency board passively,
maintaining the stability of the spot rate in the foreign exchange market.
In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that the government was pursuing
any active monetary policy at the time. A fundamental change in policy
took place when the government began to initiate a series of institutional
changes. In 1988 some new accounting arrangements, which in eﬀect made
open market operations possible, were introduced. Exchange fund bills
similar to short-term U.S. Treasury bills have been issued since March
1990. A liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) was also opened in 1990 to
provide liquidity to banks, and the HKMA was active in using the LAF.
With the new tools in hand, the HKMA acquired some central bank power
to intervene in Hong Kong’s money market.
The currency board is supposed to be a rule-based monetary system.
3. For more details of the history of Hong Kong’s currency board, see Nugee (1995) and
Kwan and Lui (1999).
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greater reliance on discretion. The most signiﬁcant case that illustrates the
exercise of discretion is the change in HKMA’s line of defense of the spot
rate from 7.8 to 7.75. Even though the oﬃcial parity is 7.8, beginning in
1992 the HKMA chose a ﬁrst-line defense at 7.75 (i.e., it would intervene
at 7.75 instead of 7.8, to give it a greater sense of security). Figure 7.1
shows that beginning around April 1992 the exchange rate could rarely
move above the 7.75 level. However, this has created a new problem.
Whenever the exchange rate rose above 7.75, the market could fear that
the HKMA would choose not to defend the peg. To restore conﬁdence,
the HKMA was forced to intervene at 7.75. In a sense, the HKMA has
become the slave of its own discretion. The rationale for a ﬁrst-line defense
is also dubious. If the HKMA fails to maintain the defense of 7.75, it is
doubtful that it will be able to maintain the ultimate defense of 7.8. An
even more serious implication of greater reliance on discretion is the ero-
sion of the public’s belief that the HKMA will always keep the peg. Be-
cause it had signiﬁcantly deviated from the passive rules of the currency
board, there would be no guarantee that it would not abandon the peg al-
together.
One of our objectives is to test whether discretion is better than rules in
strengthening the credibility of currency board. We use 1 April 1992 as a
dividing line between a rule-bound regime (“regime 1”) and a new regime
in which active discretionary interventions were pursued (“regime 2”). As
noted earlier, the dilution of rules actually began in 1988. However, the
availability of new intervention tools does not necessarily mean that the
HKMA had abandoned the rule-based regime. Moreover, it took time for
the other policy instruments such as the exchange fund bills and the LAF
to come into being and for the market to be convinced that the HKMA
was indeed moving towards the discretion regime. We have chosen 1992,
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Fig. 7.1 Spot exchange rate, 1 November 1983 to 21 April 1999.rather than 1988, as the demarcation line, because to us, the strategy of
introducing a ﬁrst-line defense was a clear indication that the HKMA had
deviated from an old rule. In implementing the empirical tests, we have
also experimented with 1988 as the dividing line between regimes 1 and 2.
See section 7.3 for more details.
One may now raise a legitimate question: Is the adoption of a ﬁrst-line
defense a bad rule, instead of the exercise of discretion? We believe it is
discretion because despite its actual behavior in the foreign exchange mar-
ket, the HKMA never made any explicit commitment to the exchange rate
of 7.75 for any speciﬁed length of time. In addition, its sudden decision
eﬀectively to close down the LAF on 23 October 1997 was always an ele-
ment of its discretion, even though the HKMA never exercised it until that
particular date when the Hong Kong dollar came under a major attack. A
more detailed description of what happened on that day will be presented
later. Again, there was no commitment about the supply of short-term
liquidity to facilitate interbank clearing until the beginning of regime 3
(deﬁned in the following paragraph). Nevertheless, one can still raise the
question: Was the HKMA’s management of the interbank clearing balance
during regime 2 the adoption of a bad rule, perhaps due to a lack of under-
standing of the operation of the interbank clearing system? As will be seen
in section 7.5, we leave the question open.
Regime 2 lasted until 7 September 1998, from which time there was a
deemphasis of discretion and a return to a rule-based regime, but with
new rules (“regime 3”). These were adopted in the midst of the Asian
ﬁnancial turmoil. Until early September 1998, the HKMA relied on inter-
est rate arbitrage (the so-called automatic adjustment mechanism or auto-
piloting) to defend the Hong Kong dollar. It posited that when there was
capital outﬂow, the resulting drain in Hong Kong dollar liquidity would
push up the latter’s interest rate, which at a suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hl e v e lw o u l d
restore stability in the exchange rate by attracting capital to return. An
interest rate hike was seen as a necessary evil in the Hong Kong dollar’s
defense against speculation. Although the interest rate arbitrage argument
makes intuitive sense, its ineﬀectiveness as a deliberate policy tool against
currency speculation cannot be well understood without knowing the im-
plications of the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system in conjunction
with the HKMA’s actions on 23 October 1997, which was known as Black
Thursday in Hong Kong.
On 9 December 1996 the HKMA introduced a new interbank payment
system, the RTGS.4 The aggregate balance of the banking system, which
can be regarded as the lubricant for interbank settlements, was subject to
what the HKMA regarded as an inescapable monetary rule of a currency
board. Because the RTGS was very eﬃcient, the aggregate balance typi-
4. For details of the RTGS, see Hong Kong Monetary Authority (1998b).
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has recognized, the small size of the balance was conducive to high interest
rate volatility. In other words, even a minor capital outﬂow could cause
the interest rate to shoot up signiﬁcantly under the said monetary rule. To
illustrate the mechanics of how the interest rate would rise following a very
minor capital outﬂow, we use the following example.
Suppose that the aggregate balance is equal to HK$2 billion, but there
is a capital outﬂow of HK$3 billion. The banks’ clients instruct the banks
to sell this amount of Hong Kong dollars for, say, U.S. dollars. If the U.S.
dollars cannot be purchased within the banking system, then the banks
must buy from the HKMA, and they can do so only by using the deposits
in their clearing accounts. If a bank does not have enough money in its
clearing balance for purchasing the U.S. dollars ordered by its clients, it
will have to borrow from the clearing balances of other banks. However,
because the total outﬂow of capital exceeds the aggregate balance, the
banks simply cannot settle their committed transactions, and thus the in-
terest rate may rise without limit. This is the case despite the banks’ receipt
of Hong Kong dollars from their clients’ accounts. In fact, even Hong
Kong dollar bank notes cannot be used to square their settlement ac-
counts.
This process results from HKMA’s deliberate adherence to what it had
regarded as an essential monetary rule of a currency board. It believed
that it was obliged to drain liquidity from Hong Kong’s money market by
the same amount as the capital outﬂow, and it chose to drain it directly
from the aggregate balance that serves as the lubricant of the interbank
settlement system. After buying Hong Kong dollars in the aggregate bal-
ance, the HKMA could delay the injection of Hong Kong dollar liquidity
back into the system. In such a situation, the aggregate balance would
shrink in size until the interest rate was squeezed up to such an extent that
the banks would suﬀer a smaller loss by using their foreign currency to buy
back the Hong Kong dollars from the HKMA to square their accounts.
However, since these Hong Kong dollars would not be delivered until one
or two days later, the banks still had to borrow from the HKMA at any
interest rate set by the latter for clearing purposes.
There was also a second kind of discretion that could raise the interest
rate. On the morning of 23 October 1997 the HKMA sent a surprising
memorandum to all the licensed banks in Hong Kong, warning them that
they might have to pay penalty interest rates if they used the LAF repeat-
edly. Receiving this memo after several days of volatile interest rates, the
banks began to panic. There were even rumors that the penalty rate could
be as high as 1,000 percent. The interbank interest rate shot up. At its
peak, the rate was close to 300 percent.
Thus, the monetary system in Hong Kong was such that the interest rate
was very sensitive to capital ﬂows. In addition, the HKMA might choose
238 Yum K. Kwan, Francis T. Lui, and Leonard K. Chengto magnify interest rate volatility through such discretionary measures as
changing the time of liquidity injection or imposing a penalty interest rate.
Until early September 1998, the HKMA’s policy making was guided by a
belief that high interest was a necessary instrument for dealing with specu-
lative attacks against the Hong Kong dollar. Moreover, a reduction in in-
terest rate volatility was seen as incompatible with the goal of exchange
rate stability. It was only after severe public criticism and heavy market
pressure during the ﬁnancial crisis that the HKMA gradually abandoned
its high interest rate defense strategy. There are several reasons for the
change in its position.
First,ahighinterestratewasnolongeraneﬀectivewaytodeterorpunish
speculators. Knowing that a small run on the Hong Kong dollar could trig-
ger the monetary mechanism to push up the interest rate, which could be
further ampliﬁed by the discretion of the HKMA, speculators could either
short the Hong Kong dollar forward or short the stock futures index before
launching an attack on the spot market of the Hong Kong dollar. Losses
in the spot market could easily be outweighed by proﬁts from the currency
forward and stock futures if speculators engaged in this double or even
triple play.5
Second, the volatile high interest rate had caused a serious credit crunch
in the banking system. In fact, Hong Kong’s real GDP experienced a 5
percent decline in 1998, mainly as a result of the credit crunch. As the
harmful eﬀects persisted, people could question the wisdom of keeping the
currency board, thus creating further pressure on the currency.
Third, the high interest rate apparently had not led to the interest arbi-
trage expected by the HKMA. The automatic adjustment mechanism
would work well only if people had enough conﬁdence in the Hong Kong
dollar. Although Hong Kong’s interest rate had been persistently higher
than that of the U.S. dollar after the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, arbitrage
had not occurred. Figure 7.2 highlights such prolonged interest diﬀeren-
tials between the one-month Hong Kong Interbank Oﬀered Rate (HI-
BOR), and the London Interbank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR) for U.S. dollar,
during the crisis period. A plausible explanation is that the interest rate
diﬀerential represented a risk premium for holding the Hong Kong dollar.
If conﬁdence deteriorated, the risk premium, and consequently the interest
diﬀerential, would simply go up without initiating a process of arbitrage.
To restore proper functioning of the automatic adjustment mechanism, the
perceived risk of the peg must be lowered.
The devaluation risk of the Hong Kong dollar during the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis, as perceived by the foreign exchange market and measured by the
currency’s forward premium, indicates a break from the past. More pre-
cisely, the forward premium was substantially higher than it was in the
5. See Cheng and Lui (1998) and Chan and Kwan (1998) for more detailed discussions.
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Kong dollar came under a major speculative attack against the back-
ground of the New Taiwan dollar’s ﬂoat, the annualized forward premium
shot up to 15 percent on 23 October 1997 (Black Thursday). The for-
ward premium reached 24 percent in the period 12–20 January 1998, when
the currency came under another major attack. In the next two attacks in
June and August 1998, the forward premium was 6–7.4 percent during
11–19 June and 10 percent between 26 August and 2 September.
Note that the series of speculative attacks against the Hong Kong dollar
took place when Hong Kong’s fundamental variables were neither very
bad nor deteriorating. First, its foreign reserves continued to rise up to
October 1997, when a major currency attack occurred. Even with a loss of
some reserves between February and October 1998, Hong Kong’s foreign
reserves ranked the third largest in the world, only after Japan and China
at the end of November 1998 (at US$88.6 billion). Second, the unemploy-
ment rate in Hong Kong before the Hong Kong dollar crisis (at about 2.5
percent) was low even by historical standards. Thus, there was no pressure
from the employment front to suggest a devaluation of the Hong Kong
dollar to reduce unemployment. There was indeed deterioration in Hong
Kong’s international competitiveness as measured by its real exchange rate
and by its trade balance (goods and services, but not including investment
income). It might potentially be a weak fundamental variable, but the
magnitude of the attacks suggests that other factors were at work.
The relationship between the exchange rate of the Hong Kong dollar
and the interest rate diﬀerential (HIBOR  LIBOR) can be captured by
ﬁgure 7.3. Line AB denotes the situation when the currency board is com-
pletely credible. The exchange rate is exactly 7.8 when the diﬀerence be-
tween HIBOR and LIBOR is zero. An increase in the diﬀerence will make
the Hong Kong dollar stronger. In other words, autopiloting works. If con-
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Fig. 7.2 One-month HIBOR and LIBOR, 1 January 1997 to 21 April 1999.ﬁdence in the Hong Kong dollar deteriorates, the curve moves to CEG. A
higher interest rate diﬀerential is needed to compensate the risk of holding
the Hong Kong dollar or to maintain exchange rate stability (point D).
That the HKMA had deviated from the ﬁxed rules of the currency board
made its commitment to the peg much less credible. The problem could
be worsened if the interest rate were signiﬁcantly pushed up due to corner-
ing of the market or discretionary measures of the HKMA. The economic
and political costs of a very high interest rate could lead more people to
believe that the peg would not be sustainable, which would weaken the
Hong Kong dollar. This is represented by the positively sloping curve EFG
in ﬁgure 7.3. Interest rate arbitrage does not work in this case. An increase
in the interest rate under such conditions is not conducive to strengthening
the Hong Kong dollar.
Believing that conﬁdence was the key to exchange rate and interest rate
stability, Alex Chan and Naifu Chen, proposed the issuance of Hong Kong
dollar put options, a rule-based exchange rate insurance scheme, as an
alternative mechanism of defending the Hong Kong dollar as early as No-
vember 1997.6 After a prolonged public debate, the HKMA ﬁnally imple-
mented (on 7 September 1998) some technical measures that were analyti-
cally equivalent to the put options. The main features of these measures
a r ea sf o l l o w s .
First, the HKMA provided a clear undertaking to all licensed banks in
6. See Chan and Chen (1999); Cheng, Kwan, and Lui (1999); and Lui, Cheng, and Kwan
(2000) for more detailed discussions of the proposal of put options.
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Fig. 7.3 Relationship between exchange rate and interest rate diﬀerentialHong Kong to convert Hong Kong dollars in their clearing accounts into
U.S. dollars at the ﬁxed exchange rate of HK$7.75 per US$1.
Second, a discount window was established to replace the LAF. Banks
can now use the exchange fund bills and notes, which are similar to U.S.
Treasury bills, as collateral to borrow overnight Hong Kong dollars from
the HKMA. The interest rate of the discount window, called the base rate,
is determined by a formula that reﬂects inﬂuences of the HIBOR and the
federal fund rate.
Third, on 14 September 1998, due to market pressure, the HKMA intro-
duced a time element into the convertibility undertaking. It speciﬁed
clearly that within the following six months, the convertibility undertaking
would be at the rate of 7.75. Later, the HKMA also announced that this
rate would be gradually changed to 7.8 over a period of 500 days.
These elements imply that banks can increase liquidity in their clearing
accounts up to an amount equal to the value of the exchange fund bills
and notes that they own. Because the convertibility undertaking is appli-
cable to the clearing balances, it is potentially also applicable to all ex-
change fund bills and notes. Previously, the monetary base consisted of
coins in circulation and CI, which backed up the bank notes. Now it in-
cludes also the aggregate balance and the outstanding exchange fund bills
and notes held by banks. As of the end of 1998, CI and coins amounted to
around HK$92 billion, aggregate balance HK$2.5 billion, and outstanding
exchange fund bills and notes HK$81 billion (Hong Kong Monetary Au-
thority 1998a). Thus, the monetary base has almost doubled. If all the
outstanding exchange fund bills and notes are used as collateral to borrow
liquidity, the new aggregate balance can rise from HK$2.5 billion to more
than HK$80 billion.
These changes have a number of implications. First, when an attack
occurs and capital outﬂow exceeds the original aggregate balance, banks
can restore the aggregate balance for clearing purposes by using the ex-
change fund bills and notes. The newly established discount window and
its associated base rate were an explicit commitment on the part of the
HKMA. As a result, short-term liquidity for the purpose of interbank
clearing has become predictable. Unlike in the past, relatively small capital
outﬂow is now less likely to cause big interest rate hikes. Second, the ex-
change fund bills and notes can be interpreted as vehicles embodying the
Hong Kong dollar put option.7 Banks can use them as collateral to borrow
from the HKMA to augment their balance, which is covered by the con-
vertibility undertaking. Third, the convertibility undertaking is equivalent
to a Hong Kong dollar put option because Hong Kong’s common law
tradition implies that the undertaking is legally binding. If the HKMA
7. Professor Merton Miller, who testiﬁed at Hong Kong’s Legislative Council in November
1998, also shared this view. See Miller (1998).
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have held the exchange fund bills and notes, which are assets denominated
in Hong Kong dollars. In other words, the HKMA has put its money where
its mouth is. It has signaled to the market that it has the incentive to follow
the ﬁxed rules of the currency board.
Thus, 7 September 1998 can be regarded as the dividing line between
regimes 2 and 3. Before this date, the ﬁxed rules of a currency board had
been substantially diluted by discretionary measures. The HKMA actively
pursued the ﬁrst line of defense by using its intervention tools without
making any commitment to its new target exchange rate. It also artiﬁcially
ampliﬁed interest rate volatility by draining liquidity directly from the
RTGS’s aggregate balance and imposing penalty interest rates on users of
the LAF. After that date, the HKMA established a discount window
whose base rate was determined by an explicit formula and both adopted
a plan to abandon the ﬁrst line of defense gradually by moving the central
parity of the ﬁxed exchange rate back to the 7.8 over a 500-day period
and clariﬁed the nature of its convertibility undertaking. Under these new
institutional arrangements, it would be much harder for the HKMA to
manipulate the interest rate.
In short, the currency board in Hong Kong, after its readoption in 1983,
has experienced three diﬀerent regimes: from a rule-bound regime to a
discretion regime, and then back to a rule-bound regime again. These
changes in regimes can be regarded as natural experiments that provide us
with an opportunity to test the relative merit of rules versus discretion.
The following section implements empirical tests and interprets the results.
7.3 Is Hong Kong’s Currency Board a Credible Target Zone?
Our strategy is to infer from ﬁnancial market data the perceived credi-
bility of the currency board arrangement across the three regimes. In this
paper we rely mainly on the forward premium (the annualized percentage
deviation of the forward exchange rate from the spot exchange rate) for
such a purpose, and the interested reader is referred to Lui, Cheng, and
Kwan (2000) for the analysis using HIBOR  LIBOR interest diﬀeren-
tials. More precisely, we extract from the forward premium data the im-
plicit risk of devaluation as perceived by the foreign exchange market,
using the drift adjustment method developed in the target zone literature.
Given the devaluation risk, we can calculate the implicit ex ante probabil-
ity of devaluation conditional on a given size of realignment. Before we
proceed, however, we should emphasize that contrary to the belief of some
HKMA oﬃcials, the apparent stability of the spot exchange rate is by itself
not proof of the peg’s future credibility. The forward premium, however,
does capture the market’s expectation of the exchange rate’s risk of devalu-
ation.
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central parity, respectively. Then one can write down an identity st  ct 
xt, where xt is by construction the spot rate’s (log) deviation from the cen-
tral parity, or the movement of the exchange rate within the target zone.
Let ct  ct  ct and the average rate of realignment from time t to t



































The left-hand side in equation (1) is the expected rate of change of the
central parity, or the implicit risk of devaluation (revaluation if negative)
as perceived by the foreign exchange market, a measure of the credibility
of the target zone. It can be recovered from observed data by estimating
the two expected rates on the right-hand side in equation (1). First, the
expected rate of total depreciation, Etst/dt, is identiﬁed with the ob-
served forward premium by appealing to covered interest parity. Second,
the expected rate of drift within the target zone, Etxt/dt, is estimated
by the linear projection of xt/dt on a vector of state variables zt,w i t h
the projection standard errors computed from a Newey-West hetero-












The state variable vector zt includes an orthogonal cubic polynomial in xt,
the current forward premium of maturity , and a measure of the slope of
the yield curve (the diﬀerence between twelve-month and one-month for-
ward premium). Our choice of state variables is based on the theoretical
target zone literature. Svensson (1991) shows that the expected rate of drift
is a negatively sloped nonlinear function of xt, a well-known property of a
credible target zone (Krugman, 1991). We specify a cubic polynomial to
capture the possible nonlinearity. The use of orthogonal polynomials, as
opposed to simple polynomials, lessens the extent of multicollinearity in
the empirical estimation. The remaining two state variables are meant to
capture the inﬂuence of stochastic devaluation risk on expected exchange
rate movements, an extension of the basic target zone model suggested
by Bertola and Svensson (1993). As in previous literature (e.g., Lindberg,
Soderlind, and Svensson 1993; Lindberg and Soderlind 1994; Rose and
Svensson 1994; Svensson 1993), we include the forward premium or the
domestic and foreign interest rate diﬀerential as a state variable. In addi-
tion, we follow Bekaert and Gray’s (1998) empirical target zone model by
including the forward premium counterpart of the slope of the yield curve
to capture the temporal proﬁle of devaluation risk.
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identiﬁed in section 7.2 for the one-month and three-month horizons. The
Chow test indicates that there have been signiﬁcant structural changes
across the three regimes, which provides empirical support to our three-
regime demarcation scheme. Besides providing an estimate of the expected
drift, the projection equations are of interest in their own right. The esti-
mation results reported in tables 7.1 and 7.2 lead to the following conclu-
sions.
First, consider the marginal relationship between the expected drift and
the current exchange rate position xt. In all the linear speciﬁcations in
which the quadratic and cubic term are excluded, the xt coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant and negative, implying that exchange rate move-
ments are mean reverting within the target zone, holding constant the level
of devaluation risk proxied by the two remaining state variables. We have
also found that omitting the two devaluation risk proxies from the regres-
sion weakens the mean-reverting property considerably. Taken together
our empirical ﬁnding supports the Bertola and Svensson (1993) model
with exogenous stochastic devaluation risk, which shifts up and down the
negative relationship between the expected drift and xt.
The evidence for nonlinear mean reversion, a property emphasized in
Krugman’s (1991) fully credible target zone model, is mixed, however.
Nonlinear mean reversion shows up in regimes 1 and 3 in the one-month
case, and also in regime 3 in the three-month case, as indicated by the
small p-values of Wald tests reported in the rows titled “Exclude P2 and
P3.” Moreover, the sign pattern of the polynomial coeﬃcients indicates
that the nonlinearity is not necessarily of the famous S-shaped (smooth
pasting) property suggested in fully credible target zone models.
Finally, the coeﬃcients of the two devaluation risk proxies—current for-
ward premium and yield curve slope—exhibit a pattern of cyclical sign
reversal across regimes. In regime 1, the two coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly
negative, suggesting that during the rule-bound period the automatic ad-
justment mechanism worked well and the peg was most credible. The two
coeﬃcients become signiﬁcantly positive in regime 2, which signals the
absence of interest arbitrage and a lack of credibility. Contrary to its own
belief, the HKMA had in fact made the currency board less credible, after
acquiring all the intervention tools during the discretion period. In regime
3, the two coeﬃcients revert back to the negative zone in most cases, indi-
cating that the board had regained credibility after returning to a rule-
bound regime.
As discussed in section 7.2, the transition from the rule-based regime 1
to the discretionary regime 2 was a gradual process. We have argued that
it is more reasonable to choose 1992, rather than 1988, as the demarcation
line between the two regimes. To test the robustness of the empirical re-
sults, we also have performed the same econometric analysis reported in












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.tables 7.1 and 7.2 on data using 1988 as the dividing line. The general
results remain the same, although there is a slight drop in statistical sig-
niﬁcance.8
Panel A of ﬁgure 7.4 depicts the estimated one-month devaluation risk
together with 2–standard deviation conﬁdence bands for regime 1. The
devaluation risk is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level if zero lies
outside of the bands. We see that most of the time the devaluation risk
was not signiﬁcant, except for a few short intervals during which the deval-
8. For lack of space, we do not report details of these results, which are available upon re-
quest.
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Fig. 7.4 One-month devaluation risk and 2–standard deviation conﬁdence bands:
A, 1 November 1983 to 31 March 1992; B, 1 April 1992 to 21 April 1999; C,1
May 1997 to 21 April 1999; D, 1 July 1998 to 21 April 1999.
A
Buation risk was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This shows that the peg
was generally credible in the rule-bound regime. In panel B of ﬁgure 7.4
we see that the peg had been under occasional devaluation pressure even
before the currency crisis period. The crisis period was dramatized by the
skyrocketing devaluation risk unseen before, as is shown in panels A and
B of ﬁgure 7.4. The rapid recovery of credibility after the return to a rule-
based currency board in regime 3 was equally dramatic (panel D of ﬁgure
7.4): The devaluation risk dropped by half overnight after the announce-
ment on 5 September 1998 and then gradually became insigniﬁcant.
The last result can be interpreted from another perspective. During the
ﬁnancial crisis, many people believed that there was a so-called Asian risk
premium because Hong Kong was regarded as part of a troubled region.
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Fig. 7.4 (cont.)
D
CThe dramatic restoration of market conﬁdence in the peg after the return
to the rule-based system is not supportive of this assertion. Had a general
Asian risk premium existed in Hong Kong, we could hardly witness its
disappearance in the matter of just a few days after the announcement of
a new policy. Even if one insists on the existence of such a premium in
Hong Kong, the evidence in panel D of ﬁgure 7.4 can at most allow us to
make two diﬀerent but related interpretations. First, the Asian risk pre-
mium was not signiﬁcant in Hong Kong. Second, Hong Kong could be
easily diﬀerentiated from the rest of Asia if the HKMA had chosen the
rule-based approach, an argument made by some researchers (see Cheng
and Lui 1998).
Given an estimate of the devaluation risk, we can recover the implicit
probability of devaluation perceived by the market. Let p
t be the probabil-
i t ya tt i m et of a realignment of random size ct during the period from
time t to t  . The expected change in central parity (expected devalua-
tion) can be written as
(3) E c p p E c realignment
p E c realignment
tt t t tt
tt t




































t/dt is by deﬁnition the expected average frequency of realign-
ment during the period from time t to t  . To illustrate how the devalua-
tion probability can be calculated, suppose that the three-month devalua-
tion risk is 7 percent and the expected devaluation size is 5 percent. In
annual terms, dt  1/4 year. Using equation (4), v
t  7/5  1.4, and p
t 
1.4/4  0.35. Panel A of ﬁgure 7.5 shows the probabilities that the Hong
Kong dollar would be devalued by 5 percent within one month and three
months throughout the crisis period up to the end of our sample. As can
be expected from theory, the probability of devaluation of the same magni-
tude within a given period is higher the longer the period. Among other
things, the ﬁgure reveals that the probability of devaluation was highest
during January 1998. For instance, the market’s predicted probability that
the Hong Kong dollar would devalue by 5 percent within three months
was as high as 60 percent. An equivalent interpretation is that the proba-
bility of a 15 percent devaluation within three months would be 20 percent.
Judged by the extent of devaluation by the New Taiwan dollar and Singa-
pore’s dollar around that time, a 10–20 percent chance of devaluation in
three months was certainly not an unreasonable expectation.
In any event, regardless of the probable size of devaluation in the event
of a depegging of the Hong Kong dollar, panel B of ﬁgure 7.5 highlights
250 Yum K. Kwan, Francis T. Lui, and Leonard K. Chengthe rapid drop in devaluation probability soon after the beginning of re-
gime 3. The following events are particularly revealing: the dramatic fall in
probability after the announcement on 5 September of a new regime, the
spike before the 14 September clariﬁcation of the convertibility undertak-
ing, and the immediate calming in market sentiments right after the clari-
ﬁcation.
The relationship between the forward premium and the current position
of the exchange rate reveals further information about the credibility of a
target zone. As is shown by Bartolini and Bodnar (1992), the relationship
can exhibit a variety of shapes depending on the monetary authority’s
credibility and its intervention policies. If the system is fully credible, then
there must be a negative relationship between the forward premium and
the deviation of the spot rate from its parity. Low credibility can invert
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Fig. 7.5 Ex ante devaluation probability (conditional on devaluation size  5
percent): A, 1 May 1997 to 1 April 1999; B, 1 July 1998 to 1 April 1999.
A
Bthe relationship into a positive one, and asymmetric credibility (i.e., the
monetary authority is more credible in preventing appreciation than de-
preciation) can generate a bimodal pattern.
Figure 7.6 reports scatter plots of one-month forward premium against
the spot exchange rate (as percentage deviation from parity). The smooth
curve is obtained by ﬁtting a ﬁfth-order orthogonal polynomial, which is
ﬂexible enough to accommodate the many shapes suggested by Bartolini
and Bodnar (1992). The U-shape pattern in panel A of ﬁgure 7.6 is due
mainly to the data points of the ﬁrst year (November 1983 to December
1984), which we highlight by triangles. This is the ﬁrst year of the newly
established currency board, during which the Sino-British negotiation over
Hong Kong’s future was in full swing and the market was understandably
skeptical about the resolve of the monetary authority. After the ﬁrst year
the board started to gain credibility, as indicated by the cloud of points in
the northwest and southeast quadrants.
The bimodal curve in panel B of ﬁgure 7.6 matches exactly the case of
asymmetric credibility and discrete intervention analyzed by Bartolini and
Bodnar (1992, ﬁg. 10, p. 388). It can be seen that the hump in the northeast
quadrant is due mainly to observations of the crisis period (1 May 1997
to 5 September 1998), whereas the lower branch of the curve is due to the
pre- and postcrisis observations. In other words, the crisis works like a
natural experiment that provides the observations crucial for us to identify
the complete curve, including the upper branch in the northeast quadrant.
This empirical pattern suggests that the seeming stability of the discretion
regime before the crisis (see ﬁgures 7.1 and panel B of 7.4) was not the
result of more intervention power as claimed by HKMA; rather, it was
because the system had not yet been subject to a shock large enough.
7.4 Rules versus Discretion: Institutions and Incentives for Intervention
One may question the previous interpretation of results, namely that the
lower credibility of the currency board during regime 2 was a result of the
HKMA’s exercise of discretion. An alternative hypothesis is that regime 2
happened to have included a major crisis—namely, the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis. In other words, if a major crisis were to occur during regime 1, then
the system would have suﬀered a similar credibility problem.
There are three answers to the above criticism. First, the demarcation
of regimes adopted in the above sections was not based on the appearance
of crisis. Rather, it was based on clear changes in institutional arrange-
ments, including the creation of the HKMA, the new accounting arrange-
ments, the issue of exchange fund bills, the adoption of the ﬁrst line de-
fense, and the deemphasis of discretion and the reversion to rules.
Second, during regime 1 there was also a major crisis in conﬁdence—
namely, the Tiananmen Square incident on 4 June 1989. Was the shock to


















































































































































Bconﬁdence of the Tiananmen incident as bad as the Asian ﬁnancial cri-
sis? On 5 June 1989 the Hang Seng stock price index fell by 21.75 percent
from the previous business day. In comparison, the Hang Seng index fell
on 23 October 1997 (Black Thursday) by 10.4 percent from the last busi-
ness day.9
Despite the comparability in the decline of stock and real estates prices,
the annualized forward premium during the Tiananmen incident was be-
low 3 percent and lasted only for a brief period. In contrast, the forward
premium during the height of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis was much larger
and lasted for a much longer period.
Third, a return to a rule-based system in September 1998 was quickly
followed by a substantial reduction in the forward premium, even though
the global ﬁnancial markets continued to be uncertain.
Despite the above arguments, we acknowledge that if the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis is regarded as truly unique, then the counterargument that the Hong
Kong currency board’s behavior during regime 2 was due to the deteriora-
tion in Hong Kong’s external environment (i.e., the contagion eﬀect) would
remain a viable, though nonrefutable, hypothesis.
Is there any theoretical justiﬁcation for a more credible system during
regime 1? In the currency board literature, there is an emphasis on separat-
ing the board from the government. A properly run currency board pro-
vides a mechanism that denies the government the option of using the
printing press to solve its ﬁscal problems. The experience of Hong Kong’s
currency board during regime 1 and regime 2 suggests that the exact insti-
tutional arrangements for implementing the currency board also matters.
Speciﬁcally, their behavior diﬀered under diﬀerent institutional arrange-
ments.
Before the HKMA took over the interbank clearing function, all com-
mercial banks as well as the HKMA had their transactions cleared at the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), a private com-
mercial bank. In those days, when capital ﬂowed out of Hong Kong and
interbank liquidity tightened when the exchange fund purchased the corre-
sponding Hong Kong dollars, the HSBC would extend credit to facilitate
settlements. That practice not only was consistent with its proﬁt incentive,
but also avoided large ﬂuctuations in the interest rate.
The newly created HKMA was not happy with this situation because it
felt that a capital outﬂow should trigger an increase in the interest rate
in order to induce capital inﬂow. Thus, it introduced the new accounting
arrangement to exert more eﬀective control over interbank liquidity and
9. Real estate property prices adjusted more slowly than did stock prices. Unfortunately,
we have not found property price indexes that are more frequent than quarterly indexes. The
index for domestic premises for the quarter ending September 1989 dropped by 3 percent
from the previous quarter. The same index ending December 1997 dropped by 2.5 percent
from the previous quarter.
Credibility of Hong Kong’s Currency Board 255hence interbank interest rates.10 Under the RTGS system, the HKMA
could engineer interest rate changes when there were capital ﬂows by
changing the size of the aggregate balance. In contrast, a private clearing
house like the HSBC would only facilitate interbank clearing. Unlike a
real central bank, it would not use the clearing function to implement
certain monetary operations that central banks regard as essential to man-
aging the monetary system. As we explained in section 7.2, the so-called
currency board rule as applied through the aggregate balance of the RTGS
system had the unfortunate eﬀect of generating predictable short-term in-
terest rate movements and thus of inadvertently assisting the currency
speculators.
Why would the HKMA have managed the aggregate balance the way it
did? There are two possible explanations. First, it did not fully understand
the implications of its operations. Its complete reversal of its earlier posi-
tion in September 1998 seems to support this explanation.11 Second, cen-
tral banks ﬁnd it inherently diﬃcult to resist the temptation to preserve
and exercise discretion. That is to say, there may be an inherent incentive
problem in preserving discretion, the exercise of which may erode credibil-
ity. Such an explanation would represent an equilibrium outcome rather
than an outcome based on mistakes and misunderstandings. As such, it
might be more appealing from certain academic perspectives. However,
whether such a theoretical model can be developed is a topic for future re-
search.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
Hong Kong’s long history with a currency board has provided us with
ample opportunities to better understand the macroeconomic implications
of this form of monetary institution. Its experiences in recent years are
particularly useful. During the early years after establishing the peg with
the U.S. dollar, Hong Kong’s currency board was essentially a passive rule-
based system. Our empirical results derived using standard methods in
the target zone literature show that the automatic adjustment mechanism
worked well and that the peg was very credible in this period.
Unfortunately, the ability to intervene in the exchange market appeared
to be too much of a temptation for the government. After gradually ex-
panding its set of monetary policy tools, the HKMA engaged in more
discretionary intervention in the money and foreign exchange markets.
Contrary to the HKMA’s own belief, and as the evidence in this paper has
10. See Yam (1991) for a detailed description of the mechanics and the rationale behind
the arrangement.
11. In the Report on Financial Market Review (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government 1998), released in April 1998, the HKMA made a rebuttal to the critics of its
interest rate hike policy and criticized all alternative policies proposed by the academics.
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made the currency board less, rather than more, credible. The erosion in
conﬁdence, as reﬂected by changes in the forward premium despite an
ultrastable spot exchange rate, culminated in even greater intervention
during the ﬁnancial turmoil of 1997 and 1998, including the direct stock
market intervention in August 1998.
During the last two weeks of August 1998, the government engaged in
an unprecedented and massive buying spree in the stock market, intending
to push up the stock index to punish what it called market manipulators.
In two weeks the government spent up to US$8.8 billion of Hong Kong’s
foreign reserves, representing about 9 percent of the total, to fund its
HK$118 billion stock purchases. The government has even become the
single largest shareholder of HSBC Holdings PLC, one of the world’s big-
gest banks, after acquiring an 8.9 percent stake over these two weeks. The
stock market intervention triggered a wave of concern over the govern-
ment’s decision to deviate from its renowned free market policies. Immedi-
ately after the stock purchases was over, Standard & Poor’s downgraded
Hong Kong’s credit rating, citing the government’s decision to wade into
the stock market.
Intense market pressure and public criticism eventually led the HKMA
to return to a rule-based regime. The announcement of some new mea-
sures, which in substance were equivalent to issuing put options for the
Hong Kong dollar, had immediately calmed the market, and the calm re-
mained even during the subsequent Russian debacle and the Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM) event. The empirical analyses show that
there had been a dramatic restoration of conﬁdence. The peg once again
was a credible system.
This paper suggests that a currency board in actual practice is not nec-
essarily a static institution. Its credibility, however, depends critically on
whether the government has a reputation for following ﬁxed rules strictly,
rather than relying on discretion. In this sense, this paper may be regarded
as an empirical contribution to the debate on rules versus discretion. In the
future, we intend to develop a theoretical model to examine the incentive
problems of a monetary authority that operates a currency board system.
Finally, we want to point out that we have not dealt with many of the
challenges to Hong Kong’s currency board. For example, is the U.S. dollar
the optimal currency to which the Hong Kong dollar should link? This
calls for a cost and beneﬁt analysis along the lines of optimum currency
area theory (Mundell, 1961). In the past, because the United States was a
much more important importer of Hong Kong goods than other countries
such as Japan, business cycles in Hong Kong tended to be synchronized
with those in the United States. This eliminated many diﬃculties associ-
ated with a ﬁxed exchange rate. By standard optimum currency area argu-
ments, the cost of losing the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism
Credibility of Hong Kong’s Currency Board 257can be severe when there are asymmetric shocks aﬀecting the members of
a monetary union aﬄicted with wage and price rigidities, which have no
choice but to endure the slow and painful process of internal wage-price
adjustment. However, as Hong Kong’s economy has become more inte-
grated with China, it is not clear that it will continue to share the same
shocks as will the United States.12 This fact alone may already create pres-
sure on the sustainability of the U.S. dollar peg and raise doubt about the
credibility of the currency board system itself.
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Comment Shin-ichi Fukuda
This paper is an interesting case study on credibility and the currency
board in Hong Kong. After providing a compact yet comprehensive histor-
ical overview on the Hong Kong currency board, the paper presented a
sophisticated empirical study of the Hong Kong dollar devaluation risk
Shin-ichi Fukuda is associate professor of economics at the University of Tokyo.
Credibility of Hong Kong’s Currency Board 259based on the daily data of exchange rates since the early 1980s. The paper
makes an important contribution in showing that even under a currency
board, a diﬀerent institutional arrangement has a diﬀerent eﬀect in estab-
lishing governmental credibility.
In order to test whether rules are better than discretion in strengthening
the credibility of a currency board, the paper divided the sample period
into three regimes: regime 1 (1 November 1983 to 31 March 1992), a rule-
bound regime; regime 2 (1 April 1992 to 6 September 1998), a regime with
active discretionary interventions; and regime 3 (7 September 1998 to
21 April 1999), a rule-based regime. The paper then demonstrated that
switching from a discretionary regime to a rule-based regime—that is,
switching from regime 2 to regime 3—reduced devaluation risk suddenly
and drastically. The result is interesting in showing that a rule-based sys-
tem is better for establishing credibility. It also provides important policy
implications for the desirability of diﬀerent currency systems. I have
three comments.
My ﬁrst comment is on the usefulness of the currency board system for
East Asian countries. Citing a successful story in Argentina, the introduc-
tion of this paper proposed the system’s usefulness as a government com-
mitment device. Although it is true that Hong Kong’s current currency
board system is one possible commitment device for the government,
Hong Kong’s experience may be diﬀerent from that of Argentina from the
view point of the optimal currency area theory.
That is, in terms of economic integration, the U.S. economy has a domi-
nant eﬀect on Argentina’s economy. Thus, it is natural for Argentina to
form a U.S. dollar currency block not only from the credibility perspective
but also from various economic points of views. However, in the case of
Hong Kong, the United States is only one of a number of important for-
eign partners. In other words, although the U.S. economy has strong im-
pacts on the Hong Kong economy, East Asian economies—particularly
those of Japan and China—also have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the Hong Kong
economy. Therefore, putting aside the credibility issue, it is not necessarily
clear whether ﬁxing the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar is a desirable
exchange rate system.
For example, suppose that there was a large depreciation of the Japanese
yen against the U.S. dollar. In this case, ﬁxing the Hong Kong dollar to
the U.S. dollar makes the real eﬀective exchange rate of the Hong Kong
dollar appreciate a lot, and may lead to undesirable eﬀects on Hong
Kong’s trade balance. Similarly, the stability of the Chinese yuan against
the U.S. dollar may be an important factor for sustaining Hong Kong’s
currency board system. If the Chinese yuan devaluates against the U.S.
dollar, the sustainability of Hong Kong’s currency board system would be
diﬃcult even under the current credible system.
My second comment is on what kind of credibility the Hong Kong Mon-
260 Yum K. Kwan, Francis T. Lui, and Leonard K. Chengetary Authority (HKMA) needs to establish through the currency board
system. In the ﬁrst-generation currency crisis model, the rule was desirable
to establish the credibility such that the government would not create ex-
cessive money supplies in response to huge ﬁscal deﬁcits. Argentina’s cur-
rency board system was a successful story in establishing this type of credi-
bility. On the other hand, in the second-generation currency crisis model,
the rule was desirable to establish the credibility such that the government
would not cause excessive inﬂation to restore macro imbalances such as
unemployment.
In Hong Kong, however, what type of credibility does the government
need to establish? In a model of time consistency such as Kydland-
Prescott, the government’s policy objective needs to be diﬀerent from that
of the market equilibrium. Then, what makes Hong Kong’s government
objective diﬀerent from the market objective? Because Hong Kong did not
have a huge ﬁscal deﬁcit, the story of the ﬁrst generation model is not
helpful in this sense. Furthermore, because domestic macroeconomic im-
balances such as unemployment rates seem not to be large, the story of
the second generation model is not useful either.
The paper implicitly assumes that Hong Kong’s economic stability can
be achieved by stabilizing the Hong Kong dollar against the U.S. dollar.
From a practical point of view, this implicit assumption might be true, but
it can be tested with actual data by looking at the stability of various macro
variables under three alternative currency board regimes. The paper dis-
cussed this for interest rate stability and showed that the credible currency
board system was actually consistent with the interest rate stability. For
other macro variables, however, the paper provided no discussion.
If the only source of economic instability is the loss of HKMA’s credibil-
ity, the nominal exchange rate stability would be consistent with the stabil-
ity of other macro variables, such as domestic price level, domestic output
level, unemployment rate, and so on. If various external real shocks are
sources of economic stability, however, it is highly possible that ﬁxing the
Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar may destabilize other macro variables
in Hong Kong.
In particular, real shocks in East Asian economies are not necessarily
closely correlated to those in the U.S. economy. If real shocks aﬀect East
Asian economies and the U.S. economy diﬀerently, the credible currency
board system can stabilize the nominal exchange rate but may destabilize
other macro variables in Hong Kong.
My ﬁnal comment is on the drastic drop of estimated devaluation risk
on 5 September 1998. This is one of the most interesting ﬁndings in the
paper, and it may imply that a return to a rule-based system can calm
the speculative behavior in the market. In fact, looking at the estimated
devaluation risk in panel D of ﬁgure 7.4 we can see that the devaluation
risk dropped by half overnight after 5 September.
Credibility of Hong Kong’s Currency Board 261Theoretically, the drop can arise either from a shock drop of forward
premium or from a drop in the expected rate of drift within the target
zone. My question is, which caused such a drastic change of devaluation
risk? When we look at HIBOR-LIBOR interest diﬀerentials in ﬁgure 7.2,
we can see a large but relatively gradual decline of interest diﬀerentials
after September 1998. If there was a sharp drop of forward premium on
5 September 1998, how can we reconcile this with relatively gradual de-
cline in interest diﬀerentials? If there was an intensifying drop in the ex-
pected rate of drift within the target zone, we probably can give some in-
tuitive interpretation for why this happened in terms of the target zone
theory. By contraction, however, the expected rate of drift can change dras-
tically when the regime changes because the coeﬃcients were estimated
separately for each regime. Although it is true that there was a big struc-
tural change from regime 2 to regime 3, the actual change in coeﬃcients
may be more gradual than what was supposed in calculating the devalua-
tion risk in the simulation.
Comment Takatoshi Ito
This paper combines ideas in the literatures of currency board, target zone,
and rule versus discretion, and then applies an empirical model to the case
of Hong Kong. The idea of the currency board became a focus of attention
in recent years, as currency board economies have ridden currency crises
well. Argentina stood well against the tequila crisis in 1995. Hong Kong
has maintained the dollar peg despite ﬁerce attacks by speculators in 1997
and 1998. Indonesia’s announcement of considering to adopt a currency
board became a source of contention between the Indonesian government
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in February 1998.
In the postcrisis discussion, the so-called two-corner solution became a
popular argument. According to this argument, the two corners—that is,
a freely ﬂoating exchange rate regime and the currency board system—are
the only stable exchange rate regimes. Hong Kong and Argentina, both
under a currency board arrangement, have survived repeated attacks on
their currencies in the second half of the 1990s. Such successes are usually
proof that the currency board is stable. This is the ﬁrst paper, to my knowl-
edge, that looks into details of the workings of a currency board. The
reader learns that the currency board in Hong Kong has experienced
diﬀerent regimes within the currency board arrangement.
The paper argues that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)
Takatoshi Ito is professor at the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi Univer-
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tionary currency board. The authors identify three regimes. In regime 1
(1983:10–1992:3), the HKMA was a rule-bound currency board, whereas
in regime 2 (1992:4–1998:9) it was a discretionary currency board; the
HKMA switched back to a rule-based currency board in regime 3 (after
1998:9). The peg of HK$7.80 to a US$1.00 has been kept since October
1983. The authors argue that the HKMA’s intervention policy with a target
zone–like band invited speculative attacks and caused the very high inter-
est rate of regime 2, whereas the rule-based currency board in regime 3
did not experience speculative attacks.
Rules versus Discretion
A narrowly deﬁned currency board is as a rule one in which any cur-
rency (monetary base, to be precise) is backed one-to-one by foreign re-
serves. On the asset side of the currency board, there are no domestic
assets, such as government bonds of that country (See Williamson 1995,
pp. 2–5.) In order to maintain the ﬁxed exchange rate, the board intervenes
in the market. Any net capital inﬂows mean an increase in foreign assets
matched by the equal amount of the increase in the domestic monetary
base. As a result, the interest rate will decrease, and capital inﬂows would
stop. Similarly, net capital outﬂows, either by capital ﬂight or withdrawal
of foreign capital, will automatically raise the interest rate, and capital
outﬂows will be deterred.
The original purpose of the currency board is to be a rigid rule to keep
the monetary authority from causing inﬂation. This is the ultimate form
of the nominal anchor, or a rule-based monetary policy. A downside of a
currency board is that it cannot provide domestic liquidity even if it is
needed, unless there is capital inﬂow. The function of lender of last resort
has to be abandoned.
In the wake of currency crises in Mexico and Asia, the currency board
has gained another role: that of generating credibility in the currency due
to suﬃcient foreign reserves. By backing every domestic note and coin
with foreign reserves, the currency seems to be resilient to a speculative
attack. However, for this function the amount of foreign reserves may not
be just enough to cover the monetary base. Demand deposits (M1) can be
converted quite easily, by domestic residents, to foreign currencies. Even
savings accounts (M2) may be quickly converted into foreign assets, if the
investors sacriﬁce some interest payments. Therefore, both Hong Kong
and Argentina have foreign reserves that exceed M1. In this regard, the
HKMA does not seem to be a pure currency board. Of course, from the
viewpoint of preventing currency attacks, having more foreign reserves
than monetary base (and even M1) means that HKMA is something more
than a pure currency board. It is better from the standpoint of being ro-
bust to speculation, but it also invites the criticism of being discretionary.
Credibility of Hong Kong’s Currency Board 263The paper well describes that discretion combined with the real-time
gross settlement (RTGS) system led to high interest rate volatility in 1997
and 1998. The paper argues that it was “only after severe public criticism
and heavy market pressure during the ﬁnancial crisis that the HKMA
gradually abandoned its high interest rate defense strategy” (239). Because
the currency board is designed to let the interest rate ﬂuctuate as capital
comes in and out, the authors’ judgment that the interest rate rose more
than the normal working of the currency board is a crucial element in
evaluating the regime 2. However, a question remains in my mind. What
would a “natural” degree of rise in interest rate be under a pure currency
board in the time period of regime 2? To what extent was “discretion”
responsible for the extra volatility in the interest rate?
I agree that neither the interest rate defense nor interest arbitrage
worked in the month of October 1997. I also support the authors’ view
that “the interest rate diﬀerential represented a risk premium for holding
the Hong Kong dollar” (239). What I am not convinced of is that a ma-
jor reason for the apparent lack of credibility of the Hong Kong dollar
peg comes from the HKMA’s discretionary policy. (The author argues, on
page 241, “That the HKMA had deviated from the ﬁxed rules of the cur-
rency board made its commitment to the peg much less credible.”) It might
have been that contagion from Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) currency devaluation and speculators’ determination based on
their success in forcing the Thai authority to abandon a de facto dollar
peg was responsible for the situation.
In summary, I like the way authors described the changes of HKMA
policies during the crisis period of 1997 and 1998. The description is con-
vincing in that even within the currency board regime, there is room to
maneuver in details, especially with respect to the relationship to the do-
mestic interbank market. I am less convinced, however, of regarding re-
gime 2 as discretionary and the regime 3 as rule-based, and making judg-
ments that regime 3 was more successful due to the rule-based policy.
The reasons for my hesitation are threefold. First, the introduction of
the ﬁrst line of defense (regime 2) at 7.75 may not be so signiﬁcant since
the diﬀerence between 7.75, and 7.80 is less than 1 percent of the par value.
Second, introducing a discount window to replace the liquidity adjustment
facility (LAF; regime 3) does not seem to be a rule-based system. The
pure currency board should not have a discount window. The diﬀerence in
opinion may be that I interpret rule-based as a pure currency board,
whereas the authors may mean something else. Third, I think that the
stability in regime 3 cannot solely be explained by the rule-based ap-
proach, but requires namely two other important elements: the HKMA’s
successful ﬁght by intervening in the stock market (August 1998); and less-
active hedge funds, which may be a result of losses from the Russian crisis.
Would the external shocks (speculative attacks) during regime 2 not
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interbank market as opposed to the foreign exchange rate gives a clue.
Again, however, if the size of the interbank market is small, then is it not
“natural” to see that the interest rate goes up automatically? How could
regime 3 be more rule-based if the interest rate did not rise? It seems to me
that the answer is based more on institutional details than on quantitative
investigation. In fact, according to the description in this paper, the degree
of discretion seems to have increased in regime 3.
Target Zone
In this paper the currency board is also expanded to include a target
zone. This has the following meaning in the model: because the currency
board with a dollar peg is in place, any interest rate diﬀerential (HIBOR 
LIBOR) is indicative of some devaluation probability (Es). However,
adding a target zone feature to this, there is a mean-reverting force. If the
current rate (s) deviates from a central rate, then the deviation (x)m a yb e
reversed in the future. The mean-reverting force (Ex) should be added to
any prediction of exchange rate changes. Therefore, even in the existence
of an interest rate diﬀerential, it may not always signify devaluation
(change in the central rate) probability, but may stay in the band of target
zone. The key is how to model this mean-reverting process. This is the
essence of regressions summarized in tables 7.1 and 7.2.
My comments on this section are twofold. First, the band is quite small,
so that the target zone application may be limited. Is more action coming
from the interest rate diﬀerential (and s) than from mean reversion? That
is, it may not be necessary to have a target zone framework, but instead
to analyze the breakdown of the interest parity as a proxy for devaluation
probability. Second, the changes of the signs of coeﬃcients may be due to
changes in the speculative force behavior (see the next section) rather than
changes in HKMA behavior from discretionary to rule-based. The authors
counter my skepticism by saying, “Had a general Asian risk premium ex-
isted in Hong Kong, we could hardly witness its disappearance in the mat-
ter of just a few days” (250). The judgment is left to the reader.
Assessment of Intervention in the Stock Market
Apparently, the speculation ended in August 1998. The paper seems to
attribute this to the regime change in September 1998 (regime 2 to regime
3). However, there may be other explanations. HKMA had conducted un-
usual operations in August 1998 by purchasing Hong Kong stocks. This
was a policy defense against the so-called double play of speculations. This
may have been eﬀective ﬁnally to quiet down speculative activities. Sec-
ond, the Russian debacle, and resulting Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) trouble may have reduced hedge fund activities, and this may
have favorably helped the Hong Kong dollar market to become stable.
Credibility of Hong Kong’s Currency Board 265Although the paper claims that the necessary institutional changes took
place well before the LTCM, it is true that a large unwinding of the hedge
funds position took place in the fall of 1998, and it was a force behind the
sharp appreciation of the yen. The environment of speculative activities
seems to be greatly diﬀerent before and after September 1998. The inter-
vention in the stock market may have been more signiﬁcant than changes
in operating procedure (discretionary to rule-based). However, investiga-
tion into the relative importance of each of these phenomena has to be left
to future research.
Concluding Remarks
This is an interesting and important paper, documenting how the
HKMA works and how the HKMA responded to crises over its currency,
mainly caused by large capital inﬂows and outﬂows. The aura around cur-
rency boards seems to be intact after a battle, because Hong Kong and
Argentina are still holding on to dollar pegs with open capital accounts. It
is an interesting question whether Hong Kong and Argentina will follow a
rigid currency board rule or deviate from the rigid rule. Some of my skepti-
cism is directed to the authors’ interpretation of regimes as discretionary
and rule-based. Another question I have is the relative importance of
HKMA policy changes in the money market versus those in the stock
market.
This paper is informative and valuable in examining the question of the
two-corner solution, but is the currency board a silver bullet for the emerg-
ing market? If so, what kind of operational regimes should the currency
board adopt? Only history will tell the answer.
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